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COMMENTS
THE SALES STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE
UNIFORM COlIIERCIAL CODE-DOES IT
PRECLUDE PROSPECTIVE IMPLIED
WARRANTIES?
During the past decade, there has been an increased realization that con-
sumers need protection. Warranties of merchantability' and fitness for the
buyer's particular purpose,2 implied in a contract for the sale of goods, are excel-
lent means for providing that protection. For this reason, some courts have
limited the application of the archaic requirement that there be privity of con-
tract in an action for breach of warranty,3 and, in some instances, the Uniform
Commercial Code has extended warranties to persons other than the immediate
purchaser.4 Thus, it is now possible in some cases for a buyer to recover against
a manufacturer on the implied warranty that the manufacturer gave to the
retailer,5 or in other words, for a consumer to recover against someone who did
not sell him the goods.
However, the impact of these protective measures may be negated somewhat
by the Code statute of limitations for breach of warranty actions.6 Terminology
in the statute of limitations section apparently has overruled long settled case
law, and precluded any cause of action for breach of an implied prospective
warranty where the cause of action accrues more than four years after delivery
of the goods. This comment will attempt to deal with this problem in the hope
that it will both shed light on the problem and bring help to the consumer.
Pre-Code law differentiated between a present and a prospective warranty.7
A present warranty relates only to the condition of the goods at the time of the
sale, and the breach occurs at that time. A prospective warranty relates to the
1. U.C.C. § 2-314.
2. U.C.C. § 2-315.
3. See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d
773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale
L.J. 1099 (1960); Comment, Sale of Goods in Service-Predominated Transactions, 37 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 115 (1968).
4. U.C.C. § 2-318 states: "A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section."
5. See Prosser, supra note 3. See also Comment, Sale of Goods in Service-Predominated
Transactions, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 115 (1968).
6. U.C.C. § 2-725.
7. See Allen v. Todd, 6 Lans. 222 (N.Y. 4th Dep't 1872). See also Citizens Util. Co. v.
American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 NXE.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962); 31
Fordham L. Rev. 609 (1963).
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future state of the goods, and the breach must occur in the future. Thus "the
clocks are in good working order" is a present warranty, while "the seeds will
produce flowers in June" is a prospective warranty. The courts had adopted the
rule that where the warranty depends upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
a future event the warranty is a prospective one.8
Under Article 2 of the Code, an action for breach of warranty must be
brought within four years after the cause of action has accrued. "A cause of
action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack
of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery
is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance
of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such perfor-
mance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered."' 0
The meaning of the word "explicitly" creates the problem. "Explicit" is
defined as "1. Distinctly stated; plain in language; clear .... 3. Clearly devel-
oped."" A warranty could be express and yet not be explicit. Thus if a buyer
asked a merchant for "a peach tree" and the seller then gave the buyer a tree
from the nursery, there would be an express warranty that the merchandise
sold was a peach tree since the buyer's description would create an express
warranty.'2 Yet, in the example cited, it is doubtful whether the warranty was
explicit in that it was not "distinctly stated" to be such.
More obvious, however, is the problem that arises with implied warranties.
It would seem that an implied warranty could not be explicit, and therefore
could not explicitly extend to future performance of the goods. Thus under the
Code there could be no implied prospective warranties. However, the section
should not be read to mean that any action for breach of an implied warranty
must be brought within four years after the time of delivery. "If that result
were intended it could have been obtained through the use of 'express' and
'implied' warranty terminology carefully used elsewhere in the statute." 18 Indeed,
the use of the word "explicit" seems to create a third class of warranties which is
comprised of both express and implied warranties, and thus it has been sug-
gested that the word "explicitly" be deleted from the statute in order to avoid
any inference that a prospective warranty must be an express one. 14
8. See, e.g., Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 257 (1961) ; Moss v. Smith, 181 Cal. 519, 185 P. 385 (1919) ; Sherer v. Park Nursery
Co., 103 Cal. 415, 37 P. 412 (1894); Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc. v. S. Riekes & Sons, Inc.,
351 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
9. U.C.C. § 2-725.
10. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (emphasis added).
11. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 291 (1961).
12. U.C.C. § 2-313 states: "(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description."
13. Hogan & Penney, Commercial Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 248, 252 (1962-63) (cita-
tions omitted).
14. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales
Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 281, 333-34 (1961).
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The official comments to the warranty of title section'G state that the war-
ranty of title, which is neither express nor implied, is not one which extends to
the future performance of the goods. However, no similar comment is made to
the sections containing the implied warranties of merchantability'( and fitness. 17
Thus, some inference may be drawn that these implied warranties can explicitly
extend to future performance of the goods.
"When a warranty, express or implied, dearly relates to a future event, or
it is within the contemplation of the parties that it have future effect, is it not
more reasonable to follow the general rule which allows parties to enter into con-
tracts the performance of which may not be fulfilled until some time in the
future?"'I s Since "freedom of contract is a principle of the Code,"' 0 and since
the Code intends the contract to consist of the complete understanding of the
parties, the answer to this question should be in the affirmative in cases of im-
plied as well as express warranties. Where, for example, seeds are sold and
impliedly warranted to produce a specific fruit, the statute of limitations should
not begin to run until it can be ascertained that the wrong seeds were sold.20 If
a manufacturer understands that a certain product will be used for a particular
purpose and knows that it will be impossible to detect any defects in the goods
until a later period, the breach of warranty should not cause the statute to begin
to run until it has become possible to ascertain whether there is a defect. This
logic has been followed in two lower court Pennsylvania cases which were
decided under the Code.
In Perry v. Augustine,2 1 an action was brought to recover for installing heat-
ing equipment in the defendant's home. The equipment was sold and delivered
in June and July of 1961. The defendant counter-claimed in July of 1965 for
breach of an express warranty that the heating system would heat well during
the winter months. The court held that the warranty came within the exception
in the statute and that it explicitly related to future performance of the goods
since "[d] iscovery of a breach of that kind of a warranty ... would necessarily
have to await winter weather. Hence, the cause of action could not have accrued
until winter weather conditions prevailed .... "22 While the warranty in this
case was express, the result should be no different if there had been an implied
warranty of fitness for the particular purpose. Surely the lack of an express
warranty does not change the nature of the case. If there had been only an
implied warranty, it would have explicitly related to future performance of the
goods.
In the second case, Hempfield Area Joint School Building Authority v.
Tectum Corp.,13 the plaintiff alleged certain warranties relative to roofing ma-
15. U.C.C. § 2-312, Comment 2.
16. U.C.C. § 2-314.
17. U.C.C. § 2-315.
18. 31 Fordham L. Rev. 609, 614 (1963).
19. U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 2.
20. Contra, Allen v. Todd, 6 Lans. 222 (N.Y. 4th Dep't 1872).
21. 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 735 (C.P. Mercer Count, 1965).
22. Id. at 418, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. at 737.
23. 46 Westmoreland L.J. 265, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 518 (C.P. Westmoreland County
1964).
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terial which had been installed. The court held that the plaintiff should have
the right at trial to prove that the warranties were prospective. The case is
clearly correct, and one who alleges a breach of warranty should always be
allowed to prove at trial that the warranty was prospective.
This logic has also been followed in a pre-Code decision in Texas where it
was held that an action for breach of an implied prospective warranty did not
begin to run until there could have been discovery 2 4 Such a method for com-
puting the statute of limitations is used in cases of fraud or deceit where the
time within which an action must be brought is computed from the time the
plaintiff discovered the fraud or could with reasonable care have discovered
it.2 5 Since an action in warranty was originally based on the tort of deceit,2 0
this reasoning is not unfounded.
The underlying policy considerations for allowing an implied warranty to
relate to future performance of the goods have been stated as follows:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived, or be divorced
before ever you marry, or harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a house never
built, or miss a train running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar
reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a sort of legal "axiom," that a
statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before that cause
of action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to the plaintiff. For a
limitations statute, by its inherent nature, bars a cause of action solely because suit
was not brought to assert it during the period when the suit, if begun in that period,
could have been successfully maintained; the plaintiff, in such a case, loses for the
sole reason that he delayed-beyond the time fixed by the statute-commencing his
suit which, but for the delay, he would have won.2 7
The counter argument is simple and basically sound. The purpose of the
statute of limitations is to protect the seller against fraudulent claims, to pre-
vent harassment, to allow for orderly business transactions, and to permit the
seller to close the books after four years. Since he is a virtual insurer during the
period, the least that can be done is to allow him to breathe freely at one time
and not subject him to liability in perpetuity. Finality in commercial dealings
is the desired goal of the law.2 8 Unless he agrees, the seller should not be
bound after the four-year period.
24. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc. v. S. Riekes & Sons, Inc., 351 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961). See also Southern Cal. Enterprises, Inc. v. D.N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d
750, 178 P.2d 785 (1947); Crawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 P. 573 (1923);
Heath v. Moncrieff Furnace Co., 200 N.C. 377, 156 S.E. 920 (1931); Cunningham v.
Frontier Lumber Co., 245 S.W. 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). It might also be noted that in
New York, for breach of an agent's implied warranty of authority, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until knowledge of the breach. See Moore v. Maddock, 251 N.Y. 420,
167 N.E. 572 (1929), in conjunction with N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 206(b) and McLaughlin,
Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 206(b) (McKinney's 1963). See also N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 206(a) (1) & (c).
25. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 338 (West 1954); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(9); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2305.09 (Page 1954).
26. See W. Prosser, Torts 651 (3d ed. 1964).
27. Dincher v. Marlin Firearms, 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
28. Hogan, The Highways and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Cornell L.Q. 1, 18 (1962).
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While the latter argument is technically sound, it does not contribute to an
efficient market place. Manufacturers and other sellers are in a better position
than consumers to bear the risk of defective goods and can always insure against
the risk. In view of the necessity for the protection of the consumer, it is sug-
gested that where factually feasible, the statute of limitations in the Uniform
Commercial Code should be interpreted to aid buyers by at least offering them
an opportunity to prove a prospective warranty whether it be implied or express.
